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IV 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant appeals from the final order granting Appellees' Summary Judgment with 
prejudice on November 27, 2007. The case was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to the 
Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-3(j) and § 78-2a-3(2)Q). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During the time period relevant to the Appellant's complaint, Appellees were the contract 
attorneys for the Utah State Prison inmates housed at the CUCF in Gunnison, Utah and at the 
Garfield County Jail. Separate contracts governed the performance of legal services at each of 
those two facilities. 
Appellant was housed at the CUCF and later transferred to the Garfield County Jail. 
Appellee Angerhofer initially met with Appellant on or about January 24, 2000 while 
Appellant was housed at the CUCF facility in Gunnison, Utah. 
The contract which Appellant alleges has been breached is Department of Corrections 
Contract #986723, which has the general purpose of providing "legal services at Central Utah 
Correctional Facility (CUCF), Gunnison, Utah". 
Contract #986723 does not provide for legal services for inmates in any facility other than 
CUCF and does not provide for continuing legal services for inmates who were once housed at 
CUCF and who have subsequently transferred to another facility. Nor does the contract provide 
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for inmates who have paroled, terminated or expirated their sentences. In particular, this contract 
did not include services for state inmates housed at the Garfield County Jail in Panguitch, Utah. 
Appellant transferred from CUCF to Garfield County Jail sometime between January 24, 
2000 and July 3, 2000. Once Appellant transferred away from CUCF, he was no longer entitled 
to services under Contract #986723. 
Appellees performed legal services at the Garfield County jail pursuant to Department of 
Corrections Contract #986774. 
On or about July 3, 2000, Appellee, Wayne A. Freestone, met with Appellant at the 
Garfield County Jail in Panguitch, Utah, pursuant to Contract 986774. This was the first 
encounter with Appellant under Contract #986774 and the second contact with Appellant under 
any contract since the initial contact at CUCF under Contract #986723, in January 2000. 
All subsequent events described in Appellant's complaint concern Appellant's stay at the 
Garfield County Jail. At no time did Appellant return to CUCF and request the services of 
Appellees. 
On or about July 14, 2000, Appellee, David J. Angerhofer, met with Appellant while 
Appellant was a state inmate housed in the Garfield County Jail. 
Appellant informed Appellee, Angerhofer, that he wished to challenge his conviction of 
June, 1999 because he was under the influence of medication at the time he entered his plea for 
the crime of first degree murder. 
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When Appellee, Angerhofer, informed the Appellant of a one year statute of limitations 
for the filing of a petition for post conviction relief, Appellant stated that the sentencing occurred 
in August, 1999. 
Appellee, Angerhofer, agreed to send to the Appellant a post conviction relief packet, but 
informed him that his statute of limitations was nearly up. 
Appellee, Angerhofer, instructed Appellant to return the packet as quickly as possible 
and to include a special note on its front to bring the statute of limitations issue to the attention of 
Appellees' staff. 
During the course of the discussion on the statute of limitations, Appellee told Appellant 
that the packet may be effectively filed "as is" due to the severe time constraints, i.e. that hand 
written petitions were acceptable to the court. Appellant agreed to this level of services. 
Appellee mailed the post conviction relief packet to Appellant on July 21, 2000, but did 
not receive the packet back from the Garfield Count jail until August 22, 2000, very close to the 
expiration of the statute of limitations according to Appellant's recollection. Appellant 
included the requested note and asked Appellees to "please process these form (sic) as soon as 
possible!" 
Appellant did not request any further review of the petition and did not request any 
additional research. Appellee, in fact, copied and filed the petition as a legally effective 
pleadings on the very same day, August 22, 2000. 
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No statute of limitations was missed. The petition was never rejected as procedurally 
insufficient. The petition was reviewed by Judge Quinn, who dismissed Appellant's petition on 
its lack of merit. Judge Quinn made four (4) full pages of findings and found the petition to be 
frivolous and that it failed to state a claim. (R.738-742). 
Appellant did not ever send Appellee any further correspondence that would indicate that 
he was dissatisfied with the level of service provided by Appellee with regards to the post 
conviction relief. 
Appellees had several contracts with the Utah Department of Corrections to assist 
inmates in the filing of initial pleadings in the areas of post conviction relief and conditions of 
confinement. Appellees never became the attorney of record for the inmates. Appellees did not 
gather evidence for the inmates. Instead, Appellees provided pivotal case law as needed and 
typically advised inmates of how to obtain necessary documentation to file a legally effective 
pleading. 
Appellant's post conviction relief petition was filed with approximately 72 pages of 
exhibits provided by Appellant and his family. (R.763-863) 
Inmates were not required to use the services of Appellees. Inmates could prepare and 
file pleading on their own. Many did so. Others merely asked the Appellee to copy and file 
pleadings that they had prepared themselves. Appellant elected to have Appellees supply forms 
and to complete the petition himself because of the impending expiration of the statute of 
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limitations. 
Appellees met with Appellant every time he requested, while he was at CUCF. 
Appellant, in fact, only requested one meeting with Appellees, while he was at CUCF. No 
pleadings, ineffective or otherwise, were filed and no statutes of limitations expired while 
Appellant was housed at CUCF. 
On or about July 16, 2002, Appellant filed a complaint against Appellees claiming that 
they breached a third party beneficiary contract by not filing his petition correctly. Among other 
things Appellant alleged a breach of the wrong contract. He did not allege a breach of the 
contract for the facility where he was housed. Consequently, the District Court granted a 
Summary Judgment in favor of Appellees. Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals, who 
upheld the dismissal. The District Court allowed Appellant to file an Amended Complaint. 
Appellant filed the Second Amended Complaint and again alleged breach of the wrong contract, 
i.e. the CUCF contract. At the time of the filing of the Second Amended Complaint, Appellant 
knew or should have known that there were different contracts for different facilities. At no 
time did Appellant ask Appellees for a copy of the correct contract. 
Appellees filed a Motion for Summary Judgment because the Appellant was alleging a 
breach of the wrong contract and because he could show no proximate cause or damages. The 
District Court granted the Summary Judgment and Appellant filed this appeal. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
By granting Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that Appellant 
failed to allege the correct contract and was not damaged the trial court disposed of all of 
Appellant's theories of liability. Appellant was not damaged, by any alleged breaches by 
Appellees because his petition for post conviction relief was dismissed on its merits, not due to 
any procedural default. 
Appellant's argument that Appellees failed to answer Appellant's First Amended 
Complaint and thus, it should be deemed admitted, fails because Appellant never filed or served 
a First Amended Complaint. 
The proposal for services made in Appellees' bid for the legal service contract with the 
Department of Corrections is not considered part of the contract that is ultimately awarded. 
Appellant knew or should have known that a separate contract governed the facility 
where he was housed and that there was no continuation of legal services under the contract 
governing the facility from which he was transferred. 
The Court's Minute Entries granting the Summary Judgment disposed of Appellant's 
Motion to Compel as well. 
Appellant's petition for post conviction relief was dismissed on its merits. Thus, 
Appellant could not have been damaged. 
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Appellees' obligation to provide access to the courts originates and ends with the contract 
for the facility housing the inmate. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT'S RULING DISPOSED OF ALL CAUSES OF ACTION. 
The court ruled that summary judgment was granted because Appellant sued under the 
wrong contract, the Appellees were under no contractual obligation to supply legal services for 
an appeal and Appellant was not damaged because Appellant's Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief was dismissed by the District Court on its merits. ® 907). Since all of the Appellant's 
alleged theories of liability rely upon duties established by contract they were dismissed. Also, 
since Appellant could not establish damages under any of his alleged theories of liability they 
were dismissed. 
II. APPELLANT HAS NOT INCURRED DAMAGES BECAUSE HIS PETITION 
FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF WAS DISMISSED ON THE MERITS. 
The District Court ruled that the Appellant sued under the wrong contract (CUCF 
Contract). Therefore, Appellees had no duty to "prepare any viable pleadings",under the 
contract plead in Appellant's Complaint. Furthermore, as ruled by the District Court, Appellant 
incurred no damage because the original petition for post conviction relief was dismissed on the 
merits, in a lengthy ruling by Judge Quinn that addressed all of Appellant's issues. 
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III. APPELLEES DID NOT FAIL TO ANSWER APPELLANT'S FIRST 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Appellant attempts to argue that Appellees failed to file an answer to the First Amended 
Complaint. 
A review of the court's file shows that on April 14, 2004 Appellant filed a Motion for 
Leave to Amend with an attached Proposed First Amended Complaint. The Certificate of 
Service shows it was mailed to Appellees on April 14, 2004. 
On April 28, 2004, the Judge signed an Order granting leave for Appellant to file his 
Amended Complaint. Also, on April 28, 2004, Appellees filed their Opposition to Appellant's 
Motion for Leave to Amend and Proposed First Amended Complaint. 
On May 7, 2004, the Judge granted Summary Judgment in favor of Appellees and 
allowed Appellant leave to file an Amended Complaint. Appellant never did file his First 
Amended Complaint and did not send to, or serve upon, Appellees a copy of the First Amended 
Complaint. The copy of the First Amended Complaint that is in the court's file is the "Proposed 
First Amended Complaint" that Appellant filed with his Motion. The Certificate of Mailing on 
the "proposed complaint" has the date of April 14, 2004. This was prior to the Court's order 
granting leave. 
Instead of filing a First Amended Complaint, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal and 
pursued an appeal of the court's ruling on the Summary Judgment in favor of the Appellees. 
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The Appellees did not fail to file an answer to Appellant's First Amended Complaint, 
because no such Complaint was ever filed or served. 
IV, A PROPOSAL FOR SERVICES MADE IN A BID FOR A CONTRACT IS NOT 
CONSIDERED THE CONTRACT. 
Appellant attempts the same argument made to the Court of Appeals in the prior appeal, 
that a bid for a contract should be considered part of the contract that is ultimately awarded. 
It is absurd to argue that a proposal for a contact supercedes the contract that is awarded 
in response to the proposal. As pointed out in oral argument in the Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the CUCF contract specifically prohibited Appellees from exceeding the services 
described in the contract. (T. 39, 40) Basic contract law states that the contract is contained in the 
4 comers of the written and signed agreement. 
V. APPELLANT KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT SEPARATE 
FACILITIES HAD SEPARATE CONTRACTS. 
The District Court dismissed Appellant's original complaint without prejudice, allowing 
Appellant to file an amended complaint "upon receipt or knowledge of the appropriate contract". 
(R.738-742) The Judge clearly put Appellant on notice that he needed to do some research and 
find the correct contract, yet he filed the Second Amended Complaint on yet another incorrect 
contract. Appellant tries to argue that the contact which is named in his Second Amendment 
Complaint, which is that of the Central Utah Correctional Facility in Gunnison, should be 
applicable to the services that the Appellees rendered while Appellant was housed at the 
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Garfield County Jail in Panguitch, Utah. A totally separate contact governs legal services at 
Panguitch. Appellant refers to bid proposal documents that were submitted to the Department 
of Corrections when Appellees were bidding on or applying for the CUCF contract. These same 
issues were addressed in Appellant's response to Appellees' original Motion for Summary 
Judgment and have been previously ruled upon by the District Court and the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in this matter specifically stated, 
"...Bluemel continued to argue that contract #996581 could be 
interpreted to cover inmates regardless of where the location they 
were housed. However, that contract is expressly limited to 
inmates located at the Draper, Utah facilities of the Utah State 
Prison. Even assuming that similar contracts exist pertaining to 
inmates housed at other facilities, Bluemel must identify the 
contract under which he claims third party beneficiary status. The 
Amended Complaint listed three (3) contracts by number, although 
one of those contracts was contract number 996581. Nevertheless, 
to the extent that the complaint alleged a theory based upon third 
party beneficiary status, the District Court did not err in requiring 
Bluemel to identify a contract as to which he was can intended 
beneficiary.'" (R.735-736) 
Bluemel v. Freestone, et al, 2004 UTApp 387 
That is the exact same argument that the Appellant is using again. Once again, he is 
identifying a contract different than the one that was in effect for the facility where he was 
housed. At the time of the Appellee's alleged breach of contract, Appellant was housed at the 
Panguitch, Garfield County Jail, which was governed by a totally separate contract from that of 
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the CUCF. Therefore, Appellant has again failed to allege the proper contract to which he 
could claim third party beneficiary status. Appellant attempts to argue that Appellees somehow 
breached the CUCF Contract. However, Appellees did not provide him any services related to 
the Post Conviction Petition while he was at CUCF. Appellant at no time, requested a copy of 
the Garfield County Jail contract. 
VI. THE COURT RESOLVED ALL ISSUES IN ITS RULING 
The June 4, 2007 minute entry at (R.662) indicates the hearing was to be on Appellant's 
Motion to Compel and Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment. The court in its minute entry 
at (R.774) indicates that the "Motions are argued to the court and submitted". The Court's 
Minute Entry of June 20, 2007, (R.745) states that after "being fully advised," Appellees' 
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Clearly the Court's Order addressed both the 
Summary Judgment and Motion to Compel. 
VII. APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF WAS 
DISMISSED ON ITS MERITS. THUS APPELLANT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
DAMAGED. 
Appellant attempts to make a case that Appellees somehow failed to fulfill their 
obligation under the CUCF contract (the wrong contract) by not reviewing, researching and 
redrafting Appellant's Petition for Post Conviction Relief. However, said petition was duly 
considered by Judge Quinn and dismissed upon the merits on December 11, 2000. Said decision 
thoroughly analyzed Appellant's factual allegations that were set forth in his petition. Judge 
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Quinn ruled that the petition lacked merit after considering the facts that were set forth by the 
Appellant. No portion of Judge Quinn's opinion was founded upon any procedural defect. 
Thus, even if Appellant had alleged the correct contract and had adequately alleged a breach by 
Appellees by not reviewing and drafting the petition, Appellant would not have been damaged by 
such a breach. In fact, Appellant has not explained how reviewing the Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief and redrafting it would have kept it from being dismissed. 
VIII. APPELLEES9 OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE ACCESS TO THE COURTS 
ORIGINATES AND ENDS WITH THE CONTRACT FOR THE FACILITY 
HOUSING THE INMATE. 
Any obligation that Appellees had to provide inmates with meaningful access to the 
courts, would have originated with the contract for the facility housing the Appellant at the time 
of his request for services. This obligation would have ended once Appellant moved from that 
facility. There was no language in the CUCF contract that would obligate Appellees to provide 
services to Appellant after he was moved from the CUCF facility. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the lower Court's Order granting 
Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this 30 day of May, 2008. 
Wayne A.*Freestone 
Attorney at Law 
Appellee 
David J. Angerjiofer 
Attorney at Law 
Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the Appellees' foregoing Brief for 
Appellees was mailed, first class mail, postage pre-paid to the following: 
David W. Brown 
Blake Professional Plaza 
2880 West 4700 South, Suite F 
West Valley City, Utah 84118 
2 DATED this _§£_ day of June, 2008. 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
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2004 UT App 387; 2004 Utah App. LEXIS 433, * 
4 of 8 DOCUMENTS 
Darren C. Bluemel, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Wayne A. Freestone and David J. 
Angerhofer, Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No. 20040485-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
2004 UTApp 387; 2004 Utah App. LEXIS 433 
October 28, 2004, Filed 
NOTICE: [*1] NOT FOR OFFICIAL 
PUBLICATION 
PRIOR HISTORY: Third District, Salt Lake 
Department. The Honorable Stephen L. Henriod. 
DISPOSITION: Affirmed. 
COUNSEL: Darren C. Bluemel, Draper, Appellant Pro 
Se. 
JUDGES: Russell W. Bench, Associate Presiding Judge, 
James Z. Davis, Judge, Gregory K. Orme, Judge. 
OPINION 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Orme. 
PER CURIAM: 
Darren C. Bluemel appeals from a summary 
judgment that dismissed his case against attorneys 
Wayne A. Freestone and David J. Angerhofer (the law 
firm) without prejudice. 
"Whether a third-party beneficiary status exists is 
determined by examining a written contract." American 
Towers Owners v. CCI Meek, 930 P.2d 1182, 1188 
(Utah 1996). The determination of third-party 
beneficiary status "can be decided on summary judgment 
as a question of law," and is reviewed for correctness. Id. 
To have enforceable rights under a contract between the 
law firm and the Department of Corrections, Bluemel 
must establish that he is an intended beneficiary of a 
specific contract. See id. 
The narrow issue presented by this appeal is whether 
the district court erred in granting summary judgment 
because Bluemel has not identified the contract [*2] 
covering him as a state inmate housed at the Garfield 
County jail, where he had contacts with the law firm. The 
district court ruled that the dismissal was without 
prejudice to proceeding on an amended complaint "upon 
receipt or knowledge of the appropriate contract." On the 
present state of this record, the district court did not err in 
entering summary judgment without prejudice. 
Bluemel contends that discovery was ongoing when 
the court granted summary judgment. Nevertheless, he 
did not oppose summary judgment based upon rule 56(f) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Instead, Bluemel 
continued to argue that Contract # 996581 could be 
interpreted to cover inmates regardless of the location 
where they were housed. However, that contract is 
expressly limited to inmates located at the Draper, Utah 
facilities of the Utah State Prison. Even assuming that 
similar contracts exist pertaining to inmates housed at 
other facilities, Bluemel must identify the contract under 
which he claims third-party beneficiary status. The 
amended complaint listed three contracts by number, 
although one of those contracts was Contract # 996581. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that the complaint alleged 
[*3] a theory based upon third-party beneficiary status, 
the district court did not err in requiring Bluemel to 
identify a contract as to which he was "an intended 
beneficiary." 
We affirm the summary judgment, which dismissed 
the case without prejudice to the filing of an amended 
complaint specifically identifying the appropriate 
contract. 
Russell W. Bench, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
